Abstract. An extensive empirical literature indicates that, even without formal intellectual property rights, innovators enjoy a variety of first-mover advantages and that 'imitation' is itself a costly activity. There is also accumulating evidence that an 'open' approach to knowledge production can deliver substantial efficiency advantages. This paper introduces a formal framework incorporating all of these factors. We examine the relative performance of an 'open' versus a 'closed' (proprietary) regime, and explicitly characterise the circumstances in which an open approach, despite its effect on facilitating imitation, results in a higher level of innovation.
Introduction
The last decade or so have seen an explosion in the level of 'open' 1 information production not only in traditional areas such as software (e.g. Linux, Firefox) but also in areas ranging from online encyclopaedias (Wikipedia) to genomic databases (the Human Genome Project). Such developments suggest that, at least in some important cases, open models of knowledge production can do as, or even better, than closed 2 ones. As we discuss
Faculty of Economics and Emmanuel College, University of Cambridge. Email: rp240@cam.ac.uk or rufus@rufuspollock.org. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution license (unported) v3.0. I thank Rupert Gatti and David Newbery for valuable input on early versions of these ideas. I also wish to thank participants at the 2008 FLOSS 2.0 workshop, as well as the editor and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. 1 For the purposes of this paper a work is 'open' or 'open-source' if it can be used, redistributed and reused freely. Here, freely means without monetary or other substantial restriction though, for example the requirement of attribution or even that derivative works be re-shared, does not render a work unfree. However it does exclude the requirement of payment or that explicit permission be sought, or the imposition of restrictions on the type of use (such as limiting it to research or non-commercial activities). Furthermore, since, without access, a piece of knowledge cannot be used it also excludes the use of secrecy -'open' knowledge must be publicly available.
2 That is those based on on secrecy, exclusive rights (IP) or some combination thereof.
further below, this is somewhat surprising and it is important to investigate carefully how and why this could be the case.
It is important to note here that we are focused on the rate of innovation and not the level of welfare. After all it is well-accepted that being more 'open' (having weaker intellectual property rights) can improve welfare by improving access. But this is certainly not the case in relation to innovation. In fact most of the traditional literature on innovation would support, implicitly or explicitly, reasoning along the following lines: the level of innovation is a function of the value that innovators (that is the original creators of a work or invention) obtain, V , and the cost they incur, F . Furthermore, it is clear that the production is rather surprising. It also points us to where we must look if we are to explain the success, or simply survival, of open approaches: either we can examine costs (F ) or income/value V . At this point it is worth recalling that repeated surveys, such as 3 A proprietary regime gives the innovator an exclusive monopoly right. As such, in the traditional view, an innovator should make at least as much -and probably substantially more -under the closed regime than under the open one. On the costs points, as we shall discuss in great detail below this assumption is not necessarily accurate. However, here we are simply illustrating a 'standard' view common in the literature. 4 It is noteworthy that much of the existing theoretical literature has tended to assume 'perfect' nonrivalry, that is, that an innovation (or creative work) once made may be costlessly, and instantaneously, reproduced if not protected by IP or hidden from others via secrecy. For example, Nordhaus (1969 ) (and following him Scherer (1972 ), in what is considered to be one of the founding papers of the policy literature, implicitly assume that without a patent an innovator gains no remuneration. Similarly, Klemperer (1990) in his paper on patent breadth makes clear his assumption of costless imitation as do Scotchmer and Green (1990) . For a more recent example see e.g. Hopenhayn and Mitchell (2001) . Levin et al. (1987) , Mansfield (1985) , Cohen et al. (2000) , and Arundel (2001) 
The Model
There is some information good, the 'innovation', 5 which can be created at fixed cost F i -the innovation cost. Once created, it may be imitated with cost F m (implicitly assumed to be common across all imitators).
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What does this imitation cost, F m , represent? The empirical literature discussed above suggests two main options: either it represents the cost of imitation in money or the cost in time. 7 In general we need not be too concerned with whether it is one of these, or the other -or some combination of both. Rather what will matter for our purposes is that the imitation 'cost' a) affects the income of the innovator b) is itself affected by the regime (open or proprietary) under which the information good is produced.
Specifically, define Π to be gross profits of the innovator (that is revenues net of all expenses other than the main innovation cost -note that throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated, when referring to profits we shall mean gross profits). Following our just stated presumption that imitation 'cost' affects the innovator's income we have that profits are a function of imitation cost:Π = Π(F m ), furthermore as imitation costs rise innovator's profits are non-decreasing: Π ≥ 0. Finally, though infrequently used in what follows, it will be useful to define Π m (F m ) as the (gross) profits of the imitators. 5 Throughout we will use the term innovation and imitation rather than alternatives such as creator and copier. Though the former are usually more associated with (patentable) 'ideas' while the second are more associated with (copyrightable) expressions no such distinction is intended here. 6 This model can easily be generalized to allow variations in imitation costs -for example imitation costs could fall as more and more imitators enter, or it could fall with time etc. 7 There are clearly other possibilities, for example imitation may be limited by the availability of skilled labour, or access to other necessary complementary assets -see e.g. Teece (1986) . However, these are both more complex to model and, we believe, of lesser importance than the main factors of time and money. In what follows, we will rarely go beyond this reduced form approach to specify the exact mechanism by which imitation costs impact on the innovator's income as this allows us to proceed with greater generality. For our purposes, all we will require is that costs and profits are all denominated in comparable terms -for example, in terms of a numeraire good 'money'. Nevertheless, it may be useful for the reader to have in mind some concrete examples of the underlying strategic interactions by which an innovator's (gross) profits are determined.
One possibility is that F m represents pure monetary cost and the innovator and imitators compete to supply a homogenous good in Stackelberg fashion (the innovator being the firstmover).
9 In that case, since imitators must cover their own fixed cost, F m defines, via a zero profit free-entry condition, the total number of imitators who enter and hence the price level. Lower imitation costs lead to more entry and hence lower prices.
Another possibility is that F m represents time, that is, the delay before imitators are able to produce a competing product. In this case the innovator enjoys a monopoly prior to imitator entry followed by some subsequent competitive game. Again it is clear that a lower imitation 'cost' corresponds to lower (gross) profits for an innovator. Yet another possibility is to have competition between innovators and imitators but with differentiated products (whether vertically or horizontally differentiated). Here, F m would be some measure of the proximity of imitators to the innovator in product space and as F m rises innovator's enjoy a larger/stronger local monopoly and hence once again have larger (gross) profits.
2.1. A Normalization. Let M be (gross) monopoly profits of the innovator (i.e. gross profits without any imitative entry). No agent's revenues can be greater than monopoly profits M . Hence, it makes sense to simplify by normalizing profits and innovation fixed costs by dividing them by M :
We can also take (normalized) profits π to be a function of f m rather than F m . It is also useful to define the proportional imitation cost φ =
Note, in what follows, in order to avoid constant repetition, we will usually omit the statement that a term is 'normalized', and the reader should remember that, by default, when referring to 'profits', 'innovation cost' etc we mean normalized (gross) profits, normalized innovation cost etc.
2.2. The Space of Innovations. In this model an innovation (under a particular regime -see next section) is specified by the tuple consisting of its 'innovation' cost and its 'imitation' cost: (f i , f m ). This conveniently allows us to visualize innovation space in a two dimensional graph (see the figures below for examples). Specifically, innovation and imitation costs are non-negative, f i , f m > 0 and, without loss of generality, under our normalizations must lie between 0 and 1. 10 Thus, under the assumptions given and using normalized variables the space of innovations is
In addition, we note that if imitation cost is less or equal to innovation cost, as is often assumed, we have: f m ≤ f i . In this case no innovation will ever lie above the 'diagonal' in the unit square and
Under the intuitive equation of area with amount, using (f i , f m ) coordinates gives the impression that the number of (potential) innovations is dropping as innovation cost drops (since the height under the diagonal is falling with innovation costs). This is rather misleading and to correct this it is natural to change to (f i , φ) coordinates in which case innovation space is again the full unit
Obviously there is a one-to-one mapping between these coordinate systems and so it does not strictly matter which we use. However, in what follows it will frequently be more convenient to work with (f i , φ) rather than (f i , f m ).
2.3. Proprietary and Open Regimes. We shall be interested in comparing different regimes under which a given innovation (or set of innovations) may be produced. A regime (R) can have two distinct effects. First, it can affects the innovation and imitation costs
, that is, the location of an innovation in 'innovation space' (IS). In particular, location of an innovation (or set of innovations) can be represented by some density function 10 Clearly the maximum revenue an innovator -or an imitator -can obtain is M . Hence, no innovation with an innovation cost above M will ever occur and thus we may, without loss of generality, ignore such a possibility. on IS, say k, which is a function of the regime -so k = k R .
11 Second, the regime may alter the profit function itself π, that is, the manner in which imitation cost affects the (gross) profits of the innovators.
Here, we focus on the first of these effects only and assume that the regime has no impact on the profit function itself -of course, it will affect profits since these are a function of imitation costs. We will be interested in comparing and contrasting two particular regimes:
a closed/proprietary one -based on some combination of secrecy and exclusive rights (e.g. patent or copyright) -and an open one. These two regimes, via their impact on imitation and innovation cost will lead to the same innovation (or set of innovations) being located in different positions in innovation space. This is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case where the move from closed to open results in a drop in both innovation costs f i and a reduction in proportional imitation costs φ (which corresponds to an even larger drop in imitation costs since f m = φf i ).
11 This distributional approach gives us a natural way to represent not only a single innovation or technology but a whole set of innovations -for example at the industry or economy wide level -as well to represent uncertainty with respect to the location of a particular innovation or technology.
Analysis
Our analysis proceeds in stages. First, we define the feasible set, that is the subset of innovations in innovation space that would occur with a particular (normalized, gross)
profits function. Next, we deduce some basic properties and structure of this feasible set. Given a particular set of (potential) innovations a regime determines their location in innovation space. Intersecting that location with the feasible set we have the set of innovations that occur under that particular regime. Since, as just discussed above, we take an approach where the profit function is assumed not to change across regimes the feasible set remains constant. Thus, finally, we look out how a change in regime affects the level of innovation by examining how the regime alters the location of (potential) innovations within innovation space, and thereby alters the intersection of these innovations with the feasible set. In particular, we can provide non-trivial conditions on the size of the reductions in innovation and imitation cost under which a move to an open regime increases the level of innovation.
3.1. The Feasible Set. Take a particular regime R. This has associated with it some (gross) profits function: π(f m ). A (potential) innovation, (f i , f m ), is feasible if, and only if, it generates a non-negative net surplus for its associated innovator: π(f m ) − f i ≥ 0 -that is if, and only if, its fixed cost is less than its (gross) profits. We may then define the 'feasible set' as the subset of IS consisting of all (potential) innovations which are feasible:
Definition 1 (The Feasible Set). The 'Feasible Set', F for a regime R is the subset of innovation space whose corresponding innovations occur under R:
As discussed above, a regime affects the distribution of innovation within innovation space and/or the profit function π itself. In the latter case (but not the former) the feasible set will then depend on the regime: F = F R . As also discussed above, by default we focus only on the former case -where the regime is taken only to affect the distribution of innovations. In this situation the feasible set is independent of the regime. Thus, in what follows we will talk simply about 'the' feasible set F , independent of the particular regime. 
The functions shown conform to the restrictions described in the text (in fact they derive from the Stackelberg example already discussed in the section 2).
What can we say about the structure of the feasible set? First, observe that the feasible set is closed and hence it includes its boundaryF = ∂F . Next note that, with innovation cost on the x-axis in the IS diagram, the feasible set will simply be the space lying to the left of the line f i = π(f m ). Since f i is plotted on the x-axis it is natural to transform this to a function of innovation cost: F is then the set lying above the line g(f i ) where g = π −1 . In terms of proportional imitation cost coordinates (f i , φ) this is the line given by h(f i ) where h = g(f i )/f i , and the feasible set are those points lying above this line.
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Thus, what is needed is to characterise how (gross) profits, π(f m ), vary with imitation costs. First recall that we have π > 0 that is (gross) profits are increasing in imitation cost. Next, observe that as we are using renormalized variables lim fm→1 π(f m ) = 1 and so (f i , 1) ∈ F ∀f i ∈ (0, 1) (in particular, (1, 1) is in F ). Similarly, the limit of (gross) profits as imitation costs go to zero must be non-negative: π(0) ≥ 0. Figure 2 shows a graphical rendering of one possible feasible set conforming to these restrictions together with a labelling of the main features (e.g. g, h curves). To go beyond these basic observations we need to introduce a condition on the profit function. First a definition: Definition 2. A function H(x) is super-linear if H(kx) ≥ kH(x) and sub-linear if H(kx) ≤ kH(x) ∀k ∈ (0, 1). That is H lies below (above) any ray from the origin to x.
12 Note that while g was increasing -as innovations cost rise so the feasible imitation cost must rise -h may not be.
Note that a sufficient condition for H to be super-linear (sub-linear) is that (a) H (0) is non-negative (b) H is quasi-concave (quasi-convex) (Pf: take 0, x as the endpoints of an interval and apply the usual definition of convexity/concavity). With this definition in place we may make our main assumption regarding the profit function π(f m ):
Assumption 3. The profit function is super-linear in imitation cost f m .
This has several important implications. However, before discussing these we should ask whether this assumption is reasonable. Our answer is a clear yes. For example, in the Stackelberg case discussed above, and analyzed at length in Pollock (2006) 14 To summarize, in any situation where (gross) profits are concave in imitation 'costs' π will be super-linear. In most normal cases (e.g. several of those just discussed) concavity follows from classic diminishing returns arguments and hence π is super-linear. We therefore feel this is a natural, and reasonable, assumption to impose. We now return to the implications of this assumption for the structure of the feasible set.
First, take any point in the feasible set (f i , f m ) and k ∈ (0, 1). Now, by super-linearity,
≥ kf i and hence the point (kf i , kf m ) is in the feasible set. In particular, for any point on the boundary of the feasible set (i.e. (π(f m ), f m ) or, equivalently, (f i , g(f i )) the entire ray from that point to the origin must be in the feasible set. This immediately implies that g(f i ), the function defining the boundary of the feasible 13 This would be a natural outcome of a model where imitators locate in relation to an innovator in quality 'space' and fm is some measure of their 'proximity' to the innovator -cf. 'breadth' in standard patent models. 14 For k ∈ (0, 1) we have π(kfm) ≈ kfm + πA ≥ k(fm + πA) = kπ(fm.
set in terms of innovation cost, is sub-linear. Changing to f i , φ coordinates this equates to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. If an innovation (f i , φ) is in the feasible set then all points on the horizontal line to its left lie within the feasible set. Equivalently, h, which defines the boundary of the feasible set, is non-decreasing in innovation cost.
Proof. Take a point on the boundary of the feasible set:
Consider a horizontal line from this point to the φ axis, i.e. points of the form (f k i , φ), φ = φ 0 , f k i = kf 0 i k ∈ (0, 1). Then (gross) profits at a point on this line (f 0 i , φ 0 ) are:
By super-linearity of π, π(kf 0 m ) ≥ kπ(f 0 m ) which we have already shown is ≥ kf i = f k i . Hence (f k m , φ) is in the feasible set. Thus, the entire horizontal line is in the feasible set. This in turn implies that h is non-decreasing (if not we would have a point on the boundary of feasible set with not all of the associated horizontal line within the feasible set -contradiction).
The implications of this result, together with the previous remarks, may be summarized in the following proposition:
For some λ, µ we may write f i = λf i , f m = µf m and, without loss of generality, µ < 1. If X is in the feasible set, a sufficient (though not necessary) condition for Y to be feasible is µ ≥ λ, that is, the (proportional) drop in imitation cost is less than the drop in (proportional) innovation cost. In addition, if X is not in F and µ ≥ λ then for µ sufficiently small (and hence λ sufficiently small) Y is feasible -that is if we reduce innovation cost and imitation costs at a proportional rate then for a sufficiently great reduction the innovation becomes feasible. Thus, take a particular innovation or technology X, and define X C = (f C i , f C m ) to be its location in innovation space under a closed regime and Figure 1 ). It will be useful to write X O in terms of the coordinates of X C by defining λ, µ, κ as:
λ, µ, measure the relative drop in innovation and imitation costs (respectively) when moving from a closed to an open regime while κ is the ratio of these (relative) changes in imitation cost to innovation cost. A large κ correspond to a situation where innovation costs have fallen much more (relatively) than imitation costs, a small κ corresponds to the reverse, that is innovation costs have dropped (relatively) much less than imitation costs, and κ = 1 corresponds to the case where both costs have fallen relatively by the same amount. Clearly we have λ, µ ≥ 0 as innovation and imitation costs cannot be negative.
In addition we have:
Assumption 6. Under a move to an open regime imitation and innovation costs either fall or remain unchanged, that is λ, µ ≤ 1.
This has been stated as an 'assumption' however this statement appears to us so selfevident from the definition of openness as to hardly merit justification. Certainly, it seems clear that by making one's work open one can only reduce the costs of 'imitation' (after all reproduction and reuse are now expressly permitted), while it seems hard to think of any circumstance in which innovation costs increase (they may stay the same -more on this below).
Given this 'assumption', we always have λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] (and hence κ ∈ [0, ∞]) irrespective of the type of the innovation and its initial location under the closed regime. This provides one of the main reasons for using relative values rather than absolute ones (e.g.
, for, with them, we would have that the change in a variable such as innovation cost was limited by its initial value (e.g.
Furthermore, relative values fit naturally with the previous results on the structure of the feasible set. We turn now, to the main question of this section. It should already be clear that the impact of a move to openness on feasibility will depend on how innovation and imitation costs change, that is on the values of λ, µ. We shall consider several distinct cases in turn. That is, a move to openness, by depriving an innovator of the use of exclusive rights or secrecy, 15 must necessarily reduce imitation costs -and reduce them significantly (hence µ << 1 not simply µ < 1). Furthermore, though usually more implicit, it is also assumed that innovation costs are unaffected by a change a regime -that is, openness has no impact on the innovator's cost of producing the initial innovation.
The implications of such assumptions are clear. Reducing imitation costs reduces an innovator's (gross) profits while costs are unchanged. Thus, an innovation that is feasible under the closed regime may become infeasible under the open one (while any innovation that is initially infeasible remains so). 16 Hence, moving to an open regime makes it less likely a given innovation is feasible and, thus, on average, reduces the level of innovation that occurs. Furthermore, with the drop in imitation costs being large (µ << 1) it is 15 In fact secrecy is usually ignored and it is simply the lack of exclusive rights that is considered sufficient to justify this result. 16 In IS space we can visualize this change as move vertically downwards (note this trajectory is the same whether in (fi, fm) or (fi, φ) coordinates). Since the feasible set lies above the line defined by a nondecreasing function g (or h) a move vertically downwards can only make it more likely a given point is not in the feasible set. evidence that an open regime can reduce the innovators cost either by simply making production more efficient or by allowing the innovator to share some of the costs with the wider user community. Let us therefore consider the more general case where a move to openness reduces innovation costs in addition to imitation costs:
Relative Change in Innovation Cost = λ < 1
Relative Change in Imitation Cost = µ < 1
Here it will be useful to work primarily with λ, κ = µ λ rather than λ, µ -that is in (f i , φ) coordinates rather than (f i , f m ) coordinates. 
17 Alternatively, suppose the drop in imitation costs is not large but (as is often also implicitly assumed) first-mover advantages are small then (gross) profits, π(fm), are close to imitation costs. Assuming that a given innovation is initially feasible we must have that its cost is close to (initial) imitation costs (fi ∈ [fm, π(fm]) and hence any reduction in profits is likely to make it infeasible.
this case an open regime is better if κ ≥ λ. In addition to this 'algebraic' proof, it is useful to consider an alternative equivalent geometrical approach based on IS diagrams as this easier to understand and provides a more intuitive presentation of the results. In IS space using (f i , φ) coordinates a change in costs given by (λ, κ), λ ≤ 1, equates to a translation of a point in the following ways, each of which is illustrated on the IS diagrams in Figure 3 :
• (λ, κ) = (1, < 1): vertically downwards. This is the 'traditional case': innovation costs are unchanged and imitation costs (κ = µ with fixed innovation costs) have dropped.
• (λ, κ) = (λ, 1): horizontally left. Innovation and imitation costs have dropped by equal proportions.
• (λ, κ) = (λ, > 1): diagonally to the left and upwards. A reduction in innovation costs with a less than proportional drop in imitation costs. One (extreme) example is the case of a reduction in innovation costs with no drop in imitation costs which corresponds to (λ, 1 λ ) (i.e. moving left along the hyperbola 1/x).
• (λ, κ) = (λ, < 1): diagonally to the left and downwards. A reduction in innovation costs with a more than proportional drop in imitation costs.
As just mentioned, Figure 3 illustrates these trajectories together with two examples of feasible sets both satisfying the (minimal) 'horizontal-line' condition. Not only is the basic result clear but we can easily deduce various other simple properties. For example, (for most feasible sets and most innovations) as κ → 0 (imitation costs fall much more than innovation costs) a closed regime is 'better' than an open one (the 'traditional' result).
Similarly, one can easily see how conditions on λ, κ will vary with the form of the feasible To conclude, if we allow, as the evidence suggests, that openness results in a fall in innovation costs as well as imitation costs then an open regime may be superior to a closed one (for innovation). Whether this is so, depends on the relative rates at which costs of innovation have fallen relative to imitation costs. It was shown that, at a minimum, with equiproportional reductions in costs openness was always preferable (and therefore was also better for any situation in which innovation costs fell less rapidly relative to imitation costs). Thus, contrary to the 'conventional wisdom', openness need not always result in a decline in innovation -in fact it might sometimes increase it. Furthermore, as was illustrated by the use of an IS diagram, stronger results could be obtained if one imposed more structure on the feasible set and/or the initial location of the innovation under the closed regime.
On this last point, it is worth observing that producers of information goods may derive some benefit from their efforts, whether monetary or otherwise, that is not affected by imitation of the original work. For example, they may be able to supply an associated complementary item -e.g. support services -which are not open to easy imitation (perhaps they are rival or proprietary), or, alternatively, they may simply derive intrinsic satisfaction from their creative endeavours.
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The existence of such an alternative, but related, source of 'income', has three significant implications. First, and most obviously, it ensures a certain minimum level of 'income' even if openness has sharply reduced imitation costs and hence innovator's (gross) profits from the original information good. Second, opening up the underlying information good is likely to increase usage thereby stimulating demand for the complementary one. 18 See e.g. Rossi (2004) for a review of these sorts of possibilities.
19 Increased imitation and dissemination may also be positive effect for the more 'intrinsic' motivations.
For example, a scientist may gain enhanced prestige (and citations) as a result of their work being more widely reused and disseminated when released openly (it is important to emphasize here that openness is perfectly compatible with a strong attribution requirement -in fact many 'open' licenses explicitly require clear attribution).
Crucially, all three of these effects act a) to increase the size of the feasible set, and b) to increase it more at low levels of the imitation cost. In terms of the IS diagram this is an increase in the feasible set in the lower left-hand quadrant. Cursory examination of the IS diagram shows that it is precisely these sort of changes in the structure of the feasible set which make openness (more) attractive (e.g. compare top and bottom diagrams in Figure   3 ). They therefore make it more likely that an open regime is superior to a closed one.
Conclusion
In this paper we have presented a simple framework with which to understand the interaction of innovation and imitation. Using it, we discussed how a move from a closed to an open regime could be represented in 'innovation space'. The approach also allowed one, at the same time, to represent (simultaneously) the set of feasible innovations -as determined by the underlying model of competition between 'innovators' and 'imitators'.
It was shown that, when innovators enjoy first-mover advantages, innovation may still occur even when imitation is (substantially) cheaper than innovation. Going further we proposed a basic condition, which if satisfied by underlying model of competition (as encapsulated in the innovator's profit function), allowed us to derive important features of the feasible set. With a regime determining the location of innovations in 'innovation space' one could use properties of the feasible set to make specific predictions about how changes in regime (e.g. closed to open) affected the level of innovation.
Starting from the accumulating anecdotal and empirical evidence that openness may confer significant efficiency advantages, we examined the situation where a move to open production resulted in a reduction in both innovation costs as well as in imitation costs -not simply a reduction in imitation costs alone as is usually assumed by the more traditional literature.
Precise sufficient conditions on the relative reductions in the two types of cost were derived under which a move to an open regime would actually increase innovation. These conditions had a particularly simple form: if the proportional reduction in innovation cost was a least as large as that in imitation cost then an open regime was better. We discussed the sufficiency aspect of this result and pointed out that in many situations it was likely that much stronger results would hold. Here however, though we provided some explicit examples to illustrate this point, we wished to remain at as general level as possible and therefore did not go further in examining specific cases -this may be a fruitful area for future work.
Nevertheless, we did observe that the ability of an innovator to sell some form of complementary good would be one major example where stronger results could be obtained.
A cursory examination of current 'real-world' practice reveals that this possibility is more the norm that the exception. For example, the author of a piece of software is often able to supply support services or additional 'plugins'. Similarly a musician gives live performances in addition to writing the music itself, and engineers may charge for consultancy as well as access to any inventions they make.
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Thus, it is likely that in a variety of areas open approaches are a sustainable form of operation and, at least in some cases, may be superior to proprietary ones. However, as should be clear, we are not suggesting that this will always be the case. It is therefore important for society to have some method for deciding for which industries, or technologies, it is so, and for which it is not. One of the primary contributions of this paper has been precisely to provide a simple, intuitive, yet rich, framework in which, by reference to an overarching 'innovation space', one can go about doing this.
